CASE COMMENTARIES
ANTITRUST
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
the proper market for Section 1 of the Sherman Act analysis of nondiscriminatory provisions included in American Express’s merchant
contract includes both the market for merchant acceptance of a
credit card and consumer use of such card. United States v. Am. Express
Co., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016).
By John Bobbitt
In United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether
the proper market for evaluating vertical restraints in the credit card
market under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012), included
only the market for merchant’s acceptance of a particular credit card or
also included a consumer’s use of such card.
In the credit card marketplace, credit card providers, such as
American Express, contract with both merchants and consumers for the
use of a credit card provider’s services. Without these contracts, a
merchant cannot accept a credit card provider’s card. Credit card
providers charge a contracting merchant a fee each time that the credit
card provider’s card is used by a consumer at the merchant’s business.
Credit card providers also charge the consumers for the use of the credit
card provider’s card in the form of interest applied to any outstanding
debts on the consumer’s credit card account. To entice a consumer to use
their card, credit card providers often offer rewards that apply each time a
consumer uses his or her card. To fund these rewards, American Express
charges the merchants a higher fee each time a consumer uses an
American Express card in the merchant’s business. This transaction
results in an increase in costs for the merchant selling the goods on a pertransaction basis when compared to alternative payment methods.
In its merchant contracts, American Express prohibited the
merchants from “stat[ing] a preference for any payment-card network
other than [American Express].” These non-discriminatory provisions
(“NDPs”) prohibited merchants from suggesting to a customer any
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alternative mode of payment to an American Express card, even if the use
of an American Express card would increase the merchant’s fees.
As a result, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sued American
Express in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York. The DOJ alleged that American Express’s NDPs were an
illegal vertical restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The
DOJ claimed that if American Express did not have these NDPs,
merchants could encourage consumers to use alternative, less expensive,
payment methods when consumers made purchases.
The district court ruled that the government “had ‘shown by the
preponderance of the evidence that [American Express’s] NDPs create[d]
an environment in which there is nothing to offset credit card networks’
incentives . . . to charge merchants inflated prices for their services.’”
United States v. Am. Exp. Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). In
reaching that conclusion, the district court cited United States v. Visa USA,
Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003), and found that the relevant market for
Section 1 analysis in the case of American Express’s NDPs was “only the
market for ‘network services,’” as opposed to the market for both network
services and card issuance.
The district court explained that the market for network services
is the market where credit card providers compete with other providers
for merchants who will accept a provider’s card. The card issuance
market, which the court determined was not relevant in its analysis, is the
market in which American Express competes with other credit card
providers who issue their own cards to consumers and those authorized
card-issuing banks who issue the credit cards of companies like Visa and
MasterCard to consumers. Accordingly, the district court found that
American Express had “sufficient market power in the network services
market to harm competition” and “that American Express’s NDPs have
caused actual anticompetitive effects on interbrand competition” in that
market by removing the ability of merchants to promote alternative
payment methods that reduced the merchant’s costs. The district court
issued a permanent injunction against American Express that prohibited
the company from enforcing its NDPs for a period of ten years. American
Express appealed the district court’s ruling in the Second Circuit.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the district court erred
in ruling that the relevant market for Section 1 analysis was only the
network services market and not both the network services market and
the card issuance market. The Second Circuit explained that the network
services market and the card issuance market are interdependent due to
the nature of the credit card marketplace. Consumers choose a credit card
provider primarily based on the reward programs that providers offer to
consumers. To offer better rewards, the card provider must charge the
merchants a higher fee each time the merchant accepts a consumer’s card
in a transaction. When a merchant engages in the network services market,
the merchant determines whether to accept a certain credit card as
payment in a transaction based on the fee assessed to the merchant. When
a consumer engages in the card issuance market, the consumer determines
which credit card to use in a transaction based primarily on the rewards
the consumer will receive. Because these two markets are so
interdependent, the Second Circuit ruled that the proper relevant market
for Section 1 analysis must include both markets.
Because the district court failed to identify the proper market for
Section 1 analysis, the Second Circuit rejected the district court’s rulings
that American Express had sufficient market power to affect competition
and that American Express’s NDPs had an anticompetitive effect. The
Second Circuit ruled that the district court erred in finding that American
Express held market power due to evidence of merchant fee price
increases with a lack of merchant attrition by American Express and
consumer demand for merchants to accept American Express cards.
Rather, the Second Circuit stated that the price increases were necessary
for American Express to remain competitive and, without them, the
number of merchants accepting American Express cards would have
decreased. Further, the court found that cardholder demands on
merchants to accept American Express cards were not evidence of
American Express’s market power. Instead, the cout suggested that this
shows the competitive benefits that existed in the consumer market from
American Express’s use of the NDPs. As for the district court’s ruling
that the NDPs had an actual adverse effect on competition, the Second
Circuit ruled that without looking at the competitive benefits for
cardholders in the interrelated consumer market, it is impossible for a
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court to determine whether the NDPs had a negative impact on
competition.
Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the district court
improperly determined that the card issuing market was irrelevant in a
Section 1 analysis on the anticompetitive effects of American Express’s
NDPs. This failure tainted the district court’s further findings that
American Express held market power and that the NDPs had
anticompetitive effects. Further, the DOJ failed to show that the NDPs
had an anticompetitive effect on the relevant market that included both
the merchant and consumer markets. As such, the Second Circuit ruled
that the DOJ failed to carry their burden under Section 1. The Second
Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to the district court, with
instructions to enter judgment for American Express.
Transactional attorneys practicing in the Second Circuit, who
represent either credit card companies like American Express or
merchants seeking to obtain contracts to accept certain credit cards in their
businesses, must keep in mind that NDPs like the one used by American
Express do not conflict with Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Attorneys
representing credit card companies may rest assured that NDPs are a valid
way of increasing the client’s business and should be advocated in
negotiations. Attorneys representing merchants seeking to obtain a
contract to accept a credit cards must be mindful of these provisions and
their current validity in the marketplace. The merchant-client will be
required to follow the provision, even if it means an increase in cost on a
per-transaction basis.

BANKRUPTCY
Third-party releases of liability in a court-confirmed bankruptcy
plan are rarely binding on non-voting creditors. In re SunEdison, Inc.,
576 B.R. 453 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017).
By Samuel Henninger
Danny owes money to his five sisters—Caroline, Catherine,
Cecilia, Christine, and Clare. He can’t pay them back in full, but he wants
to get rid of his debts and to start over. So Danny pleads for help from
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their mother, Beatrice Chambers. She agrees to help only if Danny can
obtain approval of a payment plan from a majority of the sisters. Tense
negotiation ensues. But for a classic Chevrolet Corvette, Danny owns no
assets. And unfortunately for the sisters, the proceeds from the sale of
that car will not satisfy the debt. Because it is their best option, three
sisters vote to approve Danny’s plan to sell the car, to give the proceeds
to the sisters, and to receive protection from their mother. Then Beatrice
Chambers approves the plan, even though one sister votes against it and
the final sister, Clare, doesn’t vote.
Part of Danny’s plan, however, contained a provision that released
third parties from liability for any tort claim of conversion brought by the
sisters. And before the mother approved the plan, Danny used the money
that Clare loaned him to pay for the services of Tom Parker—who
smashed her fuel-efficient Toyota Corolla with a sledgehammer.
Remember that the plan, with the release of liability, was approved by the
required number of creditor sisters and the mother. But Clare didn’t vote.
So can she now sue third-party Tom Parker for sending her import to the
junkyard?
In a nutshell, that is the issue that Judge Bernstein faced in a
bankruptcy case involving a giant in the renewable-energy industry. 1 As
debtor Danny pleaded for help from Beatrice Chambers, debtor
SunEdison pleaded for help from the bankruptcy court. As debtor Danny
received confirmation of his payment plan from his mother, debtor
SunEdison received confirmation of its plan of reorganization from the
bankruptcy court. As debtor Danny’s plan contained a third-party release
for Tom Parker, debtor SunEdison’s plan contained “a broad third-party
release . . . in favor of numerous non-debtors.” And the releasing parties
in SunEdison’s plan included “all Holders of Claims entitled to vote for
or against the Plan that do not vote to reject [it].” So people like Clare,
who held a claim against Tom Parker for his vicious treatment of her

See Charles A. Dale III, James A. Wright III & David A. Mawhinney, Silence Is
Not Consent: SunEdison Court Rejects Third Party Releases by Passive Consent, K&L
GATES (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.klgates.com/silence-is-not-consentsunedison-court-rejects-third-party-releases-by-passive-consent-11-30-2017/
(“[SunEdison] was once the largest renewable-energy development company in
the world.”).
1
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Toyota Corolla, could not sue him under SunEdison’s plan even though
she never voted to confirm it.
While no non-voting releasor, like Clare, emerged to object to the
plan, “the Court sua sponte raised whether [the release] can and should be
approved.” In short, the court answered “no and no.” On whether the
release can be approved, the Court concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction to approve the release. On whether the release should be
approved, the Court concluded that it should not because no non-voting
releasor “impliedly consented to [it].”
The debtors failed to demonstrate “that the Court ha[d] subject
matter jurisdiction to approve the [r]elease in its current form.” The test
“for bankruptcy jurisdiction [over a non-debtor’s claim] remains whether
its outcome might have any ‘conceivable effect’ on the bankruptcy
estate.” 2 And the Court found that the indemnity obligations that the
debtors owed to third parties were not enough to satisfy that test.
The non-voting releasors neither expressly consented to the
release by voting to accept it nor impliedly consented to it by silence.
“Absent a duty to speak, silence does not constitute consent.”
In this case, the debtors argued “that the warning in the Disclosure
Statement and the ballots regarding the potential effect of silence gave rise
to a duty to speak.” But the Court disagreed. It concluded that the release
should not be approved because no non-voting releasor consented to it.
The Court also concluded that approval of the release would not
be appropriate because the debtors failed to satisfy their burden under the
Metromedia test:
In deciding whether a third party release is
appropriate, courts may consider whether the
estate has received a substantial contribution,
whether the enjoined claims are channeled to a
settlement fund rather than extinguished,
whether the enjoined claims would indirectly
In re SunEdison, Inc., 576 B.R. at 461 (citing Marshall v. Picard (In re Bernard
L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 740 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Quigley Co. v.
Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos (In re Quigley Co.), 676 F.3d 45, 57 (2d Cir.
2012))).

2
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impact the debtor’s reorganization through
claims of indemnity or contribution, whether
the plan otherwise provides for payment in full
of the enjoined claims and whether the creditor
has consented. 3
Applying the test, the Court relied on several facts to decide against
approving the release: no non-voting releasor consented to it; the
creditor’s third-party claims were “extinguished rather than channeled to
a fund that will pay them”; no direct impact existed between specific thirdparty claims and the reorganization.
In conclusion, the Court stopped short of insisting that no thirdparty release could bind a non-voting releasor. One might work; just not
this one. The Court gave the debtors thirty days “to propose a modified
form of release that will bind the Non-Voting Releasors.” And the Court
added requirements for the debtors if they sought to modify the release:
They must specify the releasee by name or
readily identifiable group and the claims to be
released, demonstrate how the outcome of the
claims to be released might have a conceivable
effect on the Debtors’ estates and show that
this is one of the rare cases involving unique
circumstances in which the release of the
claims is appropriate under Metromedia. 4
This case offers many insights for bankruptcy attorneys who
represent large corporate debtors. Chief among them are the added
requirements for a binding release on a non-voting creditor provided in
the previous block quote. Going back to the example in the introduction,
debtor Danny could have increased the likelihood that Beatrice Chambers
would have approved the proposed third-party release in his plan if he
added some details to it. First, Danny should have named third-party Tom
Parker as a releasee and stated that Tom Parker would be released from
liability for a conversion tort claim brought by the sisters. Second, Danny
Id. at 462 (citing Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.
(In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.) 416 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 2005)).
4 Id.
3
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should have demonstrated that Tom Parker’s release would help the sisters
obtain the highest possible return on the sale of his Chevrolet Corvette—
perhaps Tom Parker had a perfected security interest in the car and agreed
to cancel Danny’s debt in return for the release.
While the metaphor here fails to account for the
complexity of a massive bankruptcy case in the Southern District of New
York with a corporation such as SunEdison, it helps to identify the main
takeaway from this case. Courts were unlikely to bind non-voting releasors
before, but they are even less likely to do so now. After SunEdison,
bankruptcy attorneys who represent large corporate debtors will need to
surmount an even higher burden to bind thirty-party releases on creditors
who don’t vote on a court-confirmed plan.

CONTRACTS
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the language “legal
expenses” in a contractual provision denoting awards to the
prevailing party is considered broad and not specific enough to
indicate attorney’s fees. Nyrstar Tenn. Mines-Strawberry Plains, LLC v.
Claiborne Hauling, LLC, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 776, 2017 WL 5901017
(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2017).
By Lauren Hughes
The American Rule, which is typically applied by Tennessee
courts, provides that each party pays its own attorney’s fees. One
exception exists, however, allowing the prevailing party to receive
attorney’s fees, when parties specifically or expressly provide for them in
a contract. In Nyrstar Tenn. Mines-Strawberry Plains, LLC v. Claiborne Hauling,
LLC, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 776, 2017 WL 5901017 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Nov. 29, 2017) (“Nyrstar”), the Tennessee Court of Appeals at Knoxville
addressed whether the language “legal expenses,” which was included in
the “Costs” provision of a contract, was similar and as equally specific as
“attorney’s fees” to justify that award. The Court of Appeals considered
language from the contract between the two parties, Nyrstar and
Claiborne, to determine if that language clearly intended to include
attorney’s fees. After construing such language and comparing it with
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precedent, the Court of Appeals held that the language did not carry the
proper specificity to constitute attorney’s fees, despite the addition of the
term “legal” before the term “expenses.”
In an underlying action in 2016, Nyrstar prevailed on a breach of
contract claim against Claiborne. Nyrstar then sought expenses incurred
from the suit by filing a motion for attorney’s fees and expenses based on
the contractual language which provided “[t]he Customer must pay
Nyrstar all costs and expenses incurred by Nyrstar in connection with
enforcing its rights against the Customer under an Agreement including legal
expenses and other costs incurred in recovering monies owed by the
Customer to Nyrstar.” Nyrstar, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 776, at *2
(emphasis added). In January 2017, the trial court denied Nyrstar’s motion
for attorney’s fees, finding the contractual language lacked specificity, but
otherwise granted Nyrstar an award for its incurred expenses. The court
stated that the use of “expenses” rather than “fees” has been held
inadequate to support a conclusion of attorney’s fees. Nyrstar appealed
the trial court’s judgment, claiming the court erred in finding the
contractual language insufficient to allow Nyrstar, as the prevailing party,
an award of attorney’s fees.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals analyzed the contractual phrase
“legal expenses” to determine whether it demonstrated a clear intent
between parties to provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees. An absence
of such intent goes against the freedom to contract; it is essential that
parties are aware of the language in their contract, especially when it
provides attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, which is contrary to the
American Rule and public policy. The Tennessee Supreme Court has
noted that “[t]he only way parties to a contract have been able to
specifically and expressly create a right to recover attorney fees has been
by incorporating the phrase ‘including reasonable attorney fees’ or some
other similar, yet equally specific, contractual language.” Cracker Barrel Old
Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, 284 S.W.3d 303, 310 (Tenn. 2009). In Nyrstar,
the contractual provision at issue lacked such specific language, forcing
the Court to examine whether the relevant contractual language was
“similar, yet equally specific.” Referencing the above language from the
Supreme Court’s Cracker Barrel decision, the Court of Appeals clarified that
the inclusion of “legal” before “expenses” is still construed broadly, as the
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phrase could encompass more than just attorney’s fees. Accordingly, the
language “legal expenses” lacks specificity and does not demonstrate a
clear intent by parties to provide for attorney’s fees.
Nyrstar attempted to compare the language of its contract to that
at issue in Richey v. Motion Indus., Inc. (“Richey”) and Raines Bros., Inc. v.
Chitwood (“Raines”), both of which the Tennessee Court of Appeals
construed to include attorney’s fees. In Richey, the court held that the
language “legal fees,” although more inclusive than “attorney’s fees,”
demonstrated enough specificity to include attorney’s fees in the award.
In Raines, the court indicated that the use of “fees” in reference to litigation
clearly demonstrated inclusiveness of attorney’s fees. Therefore, because
the language at issue in Nyrstar broadly provided for “legal expenses,” the
Court of Appeals held that the more specific language used in Richey or
Raines was directly distinguishable.
The decision in Nyrstar clarifies that the term “legal expenses” does
not necessarily include an award of attorney’s fees. The holding
illuminates the distinction between the uses of “fees” and “expenses”—
the former being more likely to include attorney’s fees because it is
interpreted as a narrower term, capable of the specificity required of
contractual language to support a right to attorney’s fees. In light of this
decision, there will be a presumption against awarding attorney’s fees
when the contractual language merely suggests that “expenses,” rather
than “fees,” are to be awarded. This may prove irreconcilable for current
contractual provisions that use the terms “expenses” or “legal expenses”
where the parties intended at the time of contracting for there to be an
award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, should litigation ensue.
In order to avoid issues like those addressed in Nyrstar,
transactional attorneys should be on the lookout for the inclusion of
“fees” in contractual provisions, as that could likely indicate an acceptance
to forego the American Rule. The mere assertion of the term “fees” into
a provision is required for, but does not necessarily give, an award of
attorney’s fees; moreover, unless the term is stated narrowly and in
reference to litigation, inclusion of the term “fees” is unlikely to signify an
intent to encompass attorney’s fees. In order to avoid any confusion as to
their parties’ intent, attorneys seeking to circumvent the American Rule
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should use the language “including reasonable attorney’s fees” in lieu of
other, less specific terms.

CORPORATE & FIDUCIARY DUTY
In a class action lawsuit between a corporation and its stockholders,
the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that (1) where a stockholderobjector cannot offer non-speculative evidence that the plaintiffs
had a likelihood of success on the merits of a damages claim, a
disclosure-only settlement may be adequate consideration to fairly
settle a class action suit; and (2) an objector is not entitled to
discovery where it has not presented a colorable claim that the
settlement should be disapproved. In re Pacer International, Inc., No.
M2015-00356-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2829856 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 30,
2017).
By Elizabeth Harwood
In this consolidated class action between Pacer International, Inc.
(“Pacer”) and its stockholders regarding a proposed merger, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed whether a chancery court abuses
its discretion by (1) denying a stockholder’s objection to a settlement when
a lone objector argues speculatively that the disclosure-only settlement is
unfair because there is a viable damages claim and (2) refusing to permit
an objector access to discovery materials where the objector has not
presented a colorable claim that the settlement should be disapproved.
The court of appeals affirmed on both grounds. First, the court reasoned
that the objection to the fairness of the settlement was founded on
evidence of a likelihood of success on a damages claim that was merely
speculative, which was insufficient to render the value of the information
disclosed in the settlement unfair consideration. Second, the court held
that the chancery court did not abuse its broad discretion to dictate what
discovery materials the objector was entitled to access.
This case arose out of a proposed merger between Pacer and a
subsidiary of XPO Logistics, Inc. (“XPO”). In July of 2013, Morgan
Stanley presented several potential buyers to Pacer’s board of directors.
The board authorized Morgan Stanley to contact fourteen potential
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buyers, three of whom ultimately submitted indications of interest to
acquire Pacer. Morgan Stanley had a prior relationship with potential
buyer XPO; Morgan Stanley disclosed this fact to Pacer’s board, and the
board agreed that, should XPO become a leading bidder, a second
financial advisor would be consulted.
Later in 2013, the price of Pacer’s stock rose from $6.98 to $8.95
per share. This, in part, influenced the other two bidders to withdraw,
leaving XPO as the sole bidder. XPO offered to purchase Pacer for $9.00
per share. Pacer’s board discussed the offer with Morgan Stanley. The
meetings concluded with the board instructing Morgan Stanley to
negotiate a higher purchase price from XPO, and the board decided to
consult Houlihan Lokey, a second financial advisor.
In December of 2013, another entity expressed an interest in
potentially acquiring Pacer. On advice of Morgan Stanley and Houlihan
Lokey, negotiations with this entity did not move forward. Negotiations
with XPO continued, resulting in a firm offer of $9.00 per share. Pacer
stockholders would receive, per share of Pacer stock, $6.00 in cash and a
fraction of a share of XPO stock equal to $3.00. During a board meeting
on January 5, 2014, Morgan Stanley and Houlihan Lokey advised the board
that the deal was fair to stockholders. The board approved the deal and
the merger agreement was executed that same day. Over 6,000 holders of
Pacer stock sued to enjoin the merger through various class action lawsuits
that were ultimately consolidated into one case.
Following expedited discovery, settlement negotiations began in
March of 2014. The parties agreed to settle if the board disclosed
additional information about the merger before the stockholder vote. The
board complied and the stockholders approved the merger. The chancery
court preliminarily approved the proposed settlement, set a deadline for
class members to file objections, and scheduled a fairness hearing.
Black Oak Investments LLC (“Black Oak”), one of Pacer’s largest
shareholders with three percent of its stock, objected to the settlement.
Black Oak challenged the fairness of the settlement, and requested the
court to allow it access to sensitive discovery materials to prepare to make
its case. Black Oak asserted that the board breached its fiduciary duty by
not entertaining all credible offers to get a higher purchase price and
argued that the $9.00 per share purchase price was below market value.
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At the fairness hearing, Black Oak supported its position by arguing that
Pacer should have known that HIG Capital (a Pacer competitor in which
Black Oak owned stock) would have made a higher offer based on an
attractive offer HIG Capital had made to purchase Pacer in 2012.
The chancery court denied Black Oak’s objections. The court held
that plaintiff’s lead counsel had sufficiently investigated any damages claim
and that the proposed settlement was fair and reasonable. Also, the court
refused to order the parties to provide Black Oak with the entirety of the
parties’ discovery materials, stating that it was only entitled to discovery if
there was a colorable claim that the settlement should be disapproved.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals first reached the
question of whether the chancery court abused its discretion in approving
the settlement. The court largely confined its analysis to the rule of law
set forth Denver Area Meat Cutters & Emp’rs Pension Plan v. Clayton, 209
S.W.3d 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), which focused the inquiry on the
fairness of the proposed settlement. In evaluating the fairness, Tennessee
courts must weigh “the strength of the plaintiffs’ case on the merits . . .
against the amount offered in settlement.” Id. at 591. Tennessee common
law also provides that the court is to focus on other factors, including the
level of investigation of the plaintiff’s claims, whether the negotiations
were at arm’s length, the number of objectors, the objector’s access to
information, and the experience of the parties’ counsel. In re High Pressure
Laminate Antitrust Litig., No. M2005-01747-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL
3681147, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2006).
In evaluating the strength of the case on the merits, the court of
appeals noted the uphill battle the plaintiffs would face in litigating the
class action. Courts presume that a corporation’s directors act in good
faith and in the best interests of the corporation, and discovery revealed
no evidence of bad faith. Further, in addressing Black Oak’s argument
that the board’s duty of loyalty required them to obtain the best possible
price, the court noted that this argument highlighted the plaintiffs’ burden
to prove the board could have obtained a better price for its stockholders.
The court dismissed Black Oak’s claim that Pacer’s board had the
opportunity to solicit and acquire a better offer (from HIG) as merely
speculative.
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Turning to the value of the proposed settlement, the court
recognized that while disclosure-only settlements are not necessarily
favorable, they can provide valuable consideration to plaintiffs, as in the
instant case. Moreover, other relevant factors, including the expertise of
the plaintiffs’ lead counsel and Black Oak’s being the sole objector out of
a class of over 6,000, influenced the court to conclude that the chancery
court did not abuse its discretion in finding the settlement was fair.
Next, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed whether the
chancery court abused its discretion in denying Black Oak access to
discovery materials. The court stated that the trial court’s broad discretion
in controlling an objector’s participation in a fairness hearing is well
established in precedent. It also dispelled due process concerns by
emphasizing that satisfying an objector’s rights does not mandate
“unfettered access to an existing and voluminous discovery record.”
Hershey v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., No. 07-1300-JTM, 2012 WL 4758040, at
*1 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 2012). Moreover, Black Oak, which owned stock in
Pacer’s competitor, was requesting discovery materials that included
competitively sensitive information. The court affirmed the chancery
court’s decision, concluding that to access confidential discovery materials,
Black Oak needed to first present a colorable claim that the settlement was
unfair. Based upon the record, Black Oak failed to explain how the
discovery materials would aid their ability to challenge the settlement.
Overall, the court repeatedly emphasized that the law favors
settlement. The preference for settlement is matched by the immense
burden on a plaintiff to overcome a presumption of good faith on the part
of the directors of a corporation and the difficulty in obtaining evidence
that a better offer would have been made. These barriers to successfully
objecting to a settlement are formidable, but the court does appear to
provide some leeway to tackle these obstacles.
Specifically, objectors clearly have power in numbers.
Practitioners advising objectors should view a very small number of
objectors as a red flag and (subject to applicable ethics rules) should
explain to other class members the aspects of the settlement that are unfair
or negative. Also, the court did not entirely dismiss Black Oak’s argument
that Pacer had a duty to obtain the best possible price for stockholders.
Rather, the court found issue with Black Oak’s lack of evidence of a better
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offer. Thus, evidence of an alternative offer to purchase that is more than
speculative would be helpful in demonstrating to the court a likelihood of
success on the merits.
Further, to secure access to discovery materials, practitioners
should persuasively articulate why those materials will be useful in
challenging the fairness of the settlement. The court emphasized that an
objector’s equity in a competing corporation creates a serious problem
when requesting confidential, competitively valuable discovery materials.
Practitioners could propose that requested discovery documents be
limited to exclude particularly sensitive materials, and at the very least, they
should avoid emphasizing the objector’s ownership of stock in a
competitor of the defendant corporation. Thus, while In re Pacer
International, Inc. makes it clear that successfully objecting to a settlement
will continue to be a significant challenge for minority objectors, the
opinion provides some potential strategies for future objectors.

LABOR & EMPLOYMENT
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that (1) a non-compete
agreement governed by New Jersey law is enforceable to
temporarily prohibit an ex-employee from competition in a former
work territory and (2) that the agreement’s ban on indirect
competition was breached where the ex-employee shared
commissions with subordinates that solicited his former employer’s
clients. ADP, LLC v. Manchir, No. M2016-02541-COA-R3-CV, 2017
Tenn. App. LEXIS 737, at *1-2, 2017 WL 5185458, at *0 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Nov. 8, 2017).
By Kelsey Jones
In ADP v. Manchir, No. M2016-02541-COA-R3-CV, 2017 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 737, at *1-2, 2017 WL 5185458, at *0 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.
8, 2017), the Tennessee Court of Appeals considered three main issues
regarding an agreement governed by New Jersey law: (1) whether noncompete agreements may prohibit ex-employees from competing for one
year in a former employer’s territory; (2) whether an ex-employee breaches
an ex-employer’s agreement barring indirect competition when the ex-
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employee takes on subordinates who subsequently sell similar products to
the ex-employer’s clients in the ex-employer’s territory, even if the exemployee does not personally solicit the clients; and (3) whether specific
performance is appropriate when it prohibits competition in a former area
of business.
In 2011, 2012, and 2013, appellant Eric Manchir (“Manchir”), a
sales manager for ADP, LLC (“ADP”), electronically consented to a
restrictive agreement with ADP in exchange for stock options. This
agreement with ADP (“the ADP agreement”) prohibited Manchir from
directly or indirectly soliciting or receiving business from ADP clients (1)
for services substantially similar to those Manchir had sold via ADP, (2)
in the territory assigned to Manchir by ADP, and (3) for one year following
departure from ADP. In 2014, Manchir left ADP to manage a sales team
for ADP competitor Paycor, Inc. (“Paycor”). Manchir supervised a
Paycor team that solicited in a geographic area that overlapped the area
that Manchir had been assigned during his time at ADP. Within the year,
Manchir’s Paycor team also made sales that included services substantially
similar to services offered by ADP, and a number of ADP clients switched
to Paycor as a result. Manchir did not directly contact ADP clients and
did not specifically order his team to do so. However, Manchir received a
commission on his team’s sales, including the sales to ADP clients.
Further, Manchir knew that some of his team’s sales had been made to
current or former ADP clients.
ADP sued Manchir for breach of contract in July 2014, and the
court granted ADP’s motion for summary judgment in August 2016. The
trial court carved-out a clause prohibiting solicitation of prospective ADP
clients, but found the rest of the ADP agreement enforceable, reasoning
that the ADP agreement’s geographic restrictions upon competition
(which Manchir alleged to be overbroad) were typical of restrictions
upheld by New Jersey courts. The trial court also found that Manchir’s
lack of personal contact with ADP clients was no defense to breach
because the ADP agreement prohibited indirect solicitation and because
the trial court considered Manchir to have indirectly solicited ADP
customers by managing and sharing commissions with a team that sold
competing products to ADP customers. The trial court further ordered
specific performance of the modified ADP agreement, and awarded costs
and attorney’s fees to ADP. Manchir appealed, and filed a motion to stay
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enforcement pending appeal. Neither party disputed the facts, so the
Tennessee Court of Appeals reviewed the summary judgment de novo.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals first looked to the issue of
whether the ADP agreement was enforceable. Since the ADP agreement
is governed by New Jersey law, the court relied heavily upon a leading New
Jersey case, which found that a non-compete provision is enforceable if it
“protects the legitimate interests of the employer, imposes no undue
hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public.” Solari Indus.,
Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53, 56 (N.J. 1970). The appellate court found that
ADP had a legitimate and reasonable interest in temporarily preventing
departing employees from taking ADP customers to a competitor. The
court next considered Manchir’s claim that the ADP agreement would
cause him undue hardship by forcing him to move hundreds of miles to
continue his practice. The court found no undue hardship where a
majority of Manchir’s current Paycor-assigned territory did not overlap
with areas barred by the ADP agreement. Finally, the court found no
evidence that the ADP agreement would injure the public. Therefore, the
court held the ADP agreement enforceable under New Jersey law.
The court next considered whether Manchir had breached the
ADP agreement. Manchir argued that he was not in breach because he
had not personally solicited ADP clients during his time at Paycor. The
court rejected this argument by stating that the ADP agreement prohibited
indirect competition and that accepting Manchir’s argument would permit
Manchir to actively direct his team to target ADP customers, thereby
rendering the ADP agreement hollow.
The court’s hypothetical, however, does not explain why it
determined that Manchir’s actions constituted indirect competition. In
part, this may be because Manchir’s appeal did not directly question the
definition of “indirect.” But the trial court decision on this issue suggests
an explanation: Manchir’s duties, territory, and products under Paycor
were substantially similar to those he had at ADP, and Manchir trained his
Paycor team and shared their commissions.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals, having found enforceability and
breach, considered the appropriateness of specific performance as a
remedy. Looking to New Jersey law, the court noted that specific
performance may be ordered as a remedy for breach of an enforceable
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contract where the court can determine the duties of parties and
conditions of performance with reasonable certainty, and where
performance would not be harsh or oppressive. See Marioni v. 94 Broadway,
Inc., 866 A.2d 208, 214-215 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)(collecting cases).
The court made no further comment here on enforceability of the ADP
agreement, or determination of the duties and conditions of the ADP
agreement’s terms, presumably considering both to have been laid out in
its findings of enforceability and breach. However, the court did find that
specific performance would not be harsh or oppressive because Manchir
had voluntarily consented to the ADP agreement in exchange for stock
options and because specific performance would still leave Manchir free
to solicit in most of his assigned territories. In light of the above facts and
because ADP would find it difficult to determine how much business they
had lost to Manchir’s team in order to accurately estimate their damages,
the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order of specific performance.
Having affirmed all of the trial court’s other decisions, the appellate court
affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to ADP because Manchir’s only
argument against the award relied on reversal of the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment.
Although the agreement in question here was governed by New
Jersey law, Tennessee attorneys should note that both the Tennessee trial
and appellate courts in this case probably would have reached similar
decisions under Tennessee law. Tennessee courts have upheld time
restrictions of at least three years so long as the geographic territory barred
by such an agreement only extended so far as was necessary to protect an
employer’s business interests. See Money & Tax Help, Inc. v. Moody, 180
S.W.3d 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Berry,
409 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1966)).
In this case, the Tennessee Court of Appeals noted that ADP’s
agreement reflected a legitimate business interest in protecting its
customers in Manchir’s former area of responsibility. Neither the trial nor
the appellate decision provides a list of weighted factors, much less a clear
definition to indicate how far a noncompete agreement requires a former
employee in Manchir’s position to be removed from competitive actions
of subordinates placed under his charge by a new employer. But the trial
court at least hints at the importance of such an employee’s similar duties
for both the former and present employer, as well as receipt of
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subordinates’ commissions on competing sales. The safest advice for a
client in Manchir’s position likely would be to retask, reassign or otherwise
avoid responsibility for subordinates that operate in areas that overlap
regions barred by a non-compete agreement.

REAL ESTATE & DISCLOSURE
Under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, the Tennessee
Residential Property Disclosure Act, and the Tennessee Real Estate
Broker License Act, a real estate licensee cannot be liable unless the
licensee failed to disclose an adverse fact for which he had actual
knowledge or notice. Haynes v. Lunsford, No. E2015-01686-COA-R3CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2017).
By Kendria Lewis
In Haynes v. Lunsford, No. E2015-01686-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct.
App. Feb. 2, 2017), the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed whether a
real estate licensee has a duty to investigate or inspect a property to ensure
that statements provided by the buyer are not misleading or false. This
case arose out of the purchase and sale of a cabin in Gatlinburg,
Tennessee.
On April 30, 2010, James R. Haynes, III (“Haynes”) entered into
a contract (the “Contract”) with Leslie Lunsford (“Seller”) to purchase a
cabin (the “Cabin”) for his ex-wife Sharon Hirschfield (“Hirschfield”).
Haynes and Hirschfield learned about the Cabin after employing Lynn
Chalache (“Chalache”), a licensed affiliate broker employed at Century 21
Four Seasons Realty (“Century 21”). Chalache first learned about the
Cabin while browsing Multiple Listing Service (“MLS”), a platform where
authorized listing brokers can obtain information on properties for sale.
David Dixon, the listing agent, was responsible for preparing the MLS
listing. Chalache, relying solely on the information from the MLS listing,
shared the information with Hirschfield.
Upon visiting the Cabin with Chalache, Hirschfield was satisfied
with the “new” look and smell of the cabin and decided to move forward
with the purchase. Prior to the closing, however, Hirschfield and Haynes
scheduled a home inspection. The home inspection revealed several areas
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of the home that would need repair, attention, or monitoring. Specifically,
the inspection report noted “cracks in the walls, carpenter bee holes, gaps
in the trim, signs of poor drainage, foundation and roof issues, and floors
that were not level.” Both Haynes and Hirschfield reviewed the
inspector’s report, but neither asked for any repairs to be made before
closing on the Cabin. Haynes funded the purchase of the Cabin, and
Hirschfield moved into the Cabin on June 28, 2010.
Approximately five months after moving into the Cabin,
Hirschfield noticed the odor of mildew. Within the next couple of
months, Hirschfield contacted multiple inspectors who collectively found
moisture in the walls, dead mold spores on the kitchen cabinets and ceiling
fans, water damage to the walls, and mold growth in several areas within
the Cabin. In June 2011, Hirschfield and Hayes filed an action against the
Seller, Chalache, and Century 21 (collectively, “Defendants”) for
“fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of duty to disclose adverse facts
related to the purchase of the property, and violations of the Tennessee
Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”).” TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18101. Specifically, Hirschfield and Haynes argued that Chalache failed to
exercise the reasonable care required of realtors pursuant to the Tennessee
Residential Property Disclosure Act (“TRPDA”), TENN. CODE ANN. § 665-201, and the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act (“TREBLA”),
TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-13-101. Furthermore, Haynes and Hirschfield
alleged that Chalache failed to inform them that the Cabin was not brand
new, as presented, had previously been involved in a foreclosure sale, and
contained a mold problem which the Defendants knew or should have
known.
On July 28, 2014, Chalache and Century 21 filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that they had no knowledge of the Cabin’s
existence prior to the sale or the Cabin’s mold issue. Chalache further
contended that she provided to Plaintiffs the Seller’s warranty deed, the
MLS listing, the CRS Property Report, the Buyer’s home inspection
report, the bank appraisal and Seller’s disclosures, which cumulatively
represented all the information available to Chalache. The trial court
granted Chalache and Century 21’s motion for summary judgment, finding
that Century 21 and Chalache had disclosed everything they knew about
the Cabin prior to the sale.
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In December 2014, Hirschfield and Haynes filed a motion to
reconsider, which was later denied by the trial court. An order affirming
the trial court’s original decision was entered, and Hirschfield and Hayes
filed an appeal.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for
reconsideration, finding that there was no evidence that Chalache
“violated her duty as a realtor or is liable under the TCPA for ‘unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.’” Specifically, the court interpreted provisions
from the TRPDA, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-5-206, and
the TREBLA, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 62-13-403, which
contains similar language regarding the licensee’s duty to disclose adverse
facts.
To begin, the court acknowledged that the TREBLA and TRPDA
both require a licensee to disclose any adverse facts that the licensee has
actual knowledge or notice. In its analysis, the court concluded that the
present facts did not demonstrate that Chalache had actual notice or
knowledge of the alleged misrepresentations. Furthermore, the acts did
not require the licensee to conduct a private investigation of the property.
As such, the court held that “Chalache did not have knowledge of adverse
facts within the meaning of the applicable statutes.”
Next, the court briefly discussed the misrepresentation claim. The
court explained that “the information concerning the history, condition,
and value of the Cabin and the property came through the MLS listing,
the CRS Property Report, Seller’s disclosures, bank appraisal, Buyers
home inspection, and Seller’s warranty deed.” Additionally, Chalache,
Hirschfield, and Haynes each had access to all of this information.
Chalache was not responsible for listing the Cabin. Therefore, the court
of appeals held that she did not misrepresent facts to which both parties
had access. Additionally, the court of appeals did not attribute any failure
of Hirschfield and Haynes to adequately review the information provided
to Chalache or Century 21.
Lastly, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reviewed the merits of the
claim regarding the TCPA. The TCPA forbids “unfair or deceptive acts
or practices affecting the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 47-18-104(b). A plaintiff’s recovery under the TCPA is dependent
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upon the plaintiff’s ability to prove deception and resulting injury.
Hirschfield and Haynes asserted that Chalache and Century 21 engaged in
deceptive acts when they represented that the Cabin was newly built and
of high quality. The Tennessee Court of Appeals reiterated that there was
no evidence on record to establish the truth of these claims.
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys practicing in
Tennessee should advise their clients that due diligence is necessary when
purchasing property. The court essentially disregarded each claim because
the buyers had equal access to the information possessed by the real estate
licensee. By ruling in this manner, the Tennessee Court of Appeals makes
it more difficult for buyers to obtain relief.

REAL ESTATE & PARTITIONING
The Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld an order partitioning,
partially in kind and partially by sale, real property owned by
multiple tenants in common. Breen v. Sharp, No. M2016-02415-COAR3-CV, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 742, 2017 WL 5462189 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Nov. 14, 2017).
By Brennan Foy
Under Tennessee law, any person who owns property as a tenant
in common may seek either a partition in kind, which divides the actual
property among its owners, or partition by sale, which sells the property
and divides the proceeds among the sellers, to terminate the tenancy in
common. See Crawford v. Crawford, No. E2002–00372–COA–R3–CV, 2002
Tenn. App. LEXIS 814, 2002 WL 31528504 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14,
2002); Nicely v. Nicely, 293 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956). However,
Tennessee law generally favors a partition in kind, unless certain
conditions make doing so infeasible or impossible. Tennessee statute
allows for partition by sale “(1) if the premises are so situated that partition
thereof cannot be made; or (2) [w]here the premises are of such
description that it would be manifestly for the advantage of the parties that
the same should be sold instead of partitioned [in kind].” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 29-27-201. In Breen v. Sharp, No. M2016-02415-COA-R3-CV, 2017
Tenn. App. LEXIS 742, 2017 WL 5462189 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14,
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2017), the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed whether it was
appropriate to order the partial partition in kind and partial partition by
sale of three tracts of land owned by tenants in common.
Following the death of Doxie Crutcher in January 2012, Crutcher’s
trust divided her estate between her daughter, Janice Sharp (“Sharp”), and
her grandsons, Caleb Breen (“Caleb”) and Travis Breen (“Travis”). The
relevant portion of the trust stated that Crutcher’s estate should be divided
“into two equal shares,” with one share distributed to Sharp, one-half
share to Caleb, and one-half share to Travis. The estate consisted of three
tracts of land (“Tract 1,” “Tract 2,” and “Tract 3”), in Stewart County,
Tennessee. The combined tracts totaled approximately 238 acres.
On July 24, 2014, Mike Breen, acting in his role as trustee of his
sons’ shares of the property, brought an action to partition the three tracts
by sale and distribute the proceeds between Sharp, Caleb, and Travis. In
response, Sharp requested the property be partitioned in kind, particularly
because of her sentimental attachment to an old schoolhouse located on
Tract 2 where her grandmother taught and mother, Crutcher, attended.
The court referred this action to a special clerk and master to determine
the ownership rights of all parties to the property and whether the land
was capable of being partitioned in kind. Prior to the special master’s
report, Sharp filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court
declined to rule on.
The special master’s findings determined that Sharp owned a onehalf interest in the property, Caleb and Travis each owned a one-fourth
interest in the property, and that the topography and location of the
properties “would make it ‘virtually impossible to partition the property in
kind so as to give each cotenant an equal share by value and acreage.’”
As the result of these findings, the court ordered the partition by
sale of the properties with the proceeds to be divided between Sharp,
Caleb, and Travis, with one exception. Because of Sharp’s sentimental
attachment to the old schoolhouse, the court ordered a partial partition in
kind of Tract 2, where the schoolhouse was located. This allowed Sharp
to maintain her one-half interest in the 54 acres of Tract 2 where the
school house was located and also buy Caleb and Travis’s interest in the
property by paying each one-fourth of the property’s value.
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Despite receiving full ownership of the western half of Tract 2,
Sharp appealed the court’s decision to order the partition by sale.
Specifically, Sharp appealed the rulings that Caleb and Travis each held a
one-fourth interest in the properties and that a partition in kind was not
possible. Sharp also appealed the court’s valuation of the half of Tract 2.
On appeal, the court affirmed the ruling that Caleb and Travis each
had a one-fourth interest in the properties, relying on the clear intent of
Crutcher in the trust document. The court held the trust unambiguously
gave Sharp a one-half interest and Caleb and Travis each a one-fourth
interest because Caleb and Travis each received half of the share granted
to them and “[o]ne-half of one-half is one-fourth.”
The court also affirmed the ruling that, aside from the western half
of Tract 2, a partition in kind was not possible. Although Sharp argued
that Caleb and Travis failed to prove one of the conditions of Tenn. Code
Ann. § 29-27-104 existed, the court relied on the findings by the special
master and trial court that Tract 1, Tract 3, and the other half of Tract 2
could not be partitioned in kind in a way that would “give each cotenant
an equal share by value and acreage.” This was because the tracts of land
were “of significantly different acreage, shape, topography, and value” and
a partition in kind would “result in some tracts having limited, if any,
public access without ingress and egress easements. . . ” – dramatically
reducing the value of the divided properties.
However, the court did agree with Sharp that the trial court erred
in its valuation of the western half of Tract 2. The trial court held that the
value of the land was $3,600 per acre. This valuation resulted in Sharp
having to pay Caleb and Travis a total of $195,948 for their combined onehalf property interests. This figure was based on the valuation determined
by James Settles, a land consultant, that testified during the initial trial. The
court of appeals concluded that Mr. Settles was qualified to render an
opinion as to the value of the property, despite not being a licensed
appraiser, as long as it was not an appraisal. However, Settles’s “opinion
of the value of the tract was not sufficiently competent to be admissible”
because he had not inspected the property. Instead, he relied solely on
topographical maps and sales of considerably smaller tracts. Another
witness, Teresa Howell, a licensed real estate broker, testified that the value
was $2,500 per acre. She had had recently done research into comparable
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sales in the same area and there were no objections to her testimony.
Therefore, the court of appeals agreed that the value was $2,500 and
remanded the issue to the trial court to set the value of the western half at
$2,500, which substantially reduced the amount Sharp was required to pay
Caleb and Travis for their interests in the property.
Overall, Breen further clarifies Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-27-104 and
existing case law regarding the circumstances that make a partition by sale
appropriate. Although a partition in kind is the generally preferred
solution when a tenant in common seeks to divide a piece of real property,
Breen illustrates that a partition by sale, or a partial partition in kind and
partial partition by sale, may be the only option that allows the property to
be partitioned without unjustly disadvantaging a party with ownership
interests. In light of this decision, attorneys engaged in real estate
transactions should be aware of this holding and anticipate issues that may
make it impossible to partition their client’s property in kind.
Similarly, Tennessee estate planning attorneys should take note of
the issues presented in Breen when drafting trust instruments to reduce the
likelihood of similar conflicts arising. Estate planning attorneys should
carefully discuss with their clients the potential conflicts that may arise out
of an estate plan that creates tenants in common, particularly when there
is a sentimental connection to the property such as the schoolhouse in
Breen, and work to better address their wishes in the will or trust
instrument. While clients with smaller estates may be unable to avoid
creating tenants in common while also providing for all their intended
beneficiaries, clients with larger estates may be better able to carry out their
wishes by specifically dividing their property among their intended
beneficiaries in the will or trust, which would eliminate tenants in common
and prevent potential claims for partition.
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TAX
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a
taxpayer group that files a consolidated return cannot take a double
deduction unless there is a statute or regulation that definitively
allows it, upholding and sustaining the Ilfeld doctrine. Duquesne Light
Holdings, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 861 F.3d 396, 399
(3d Cir. 2017) [hereinafter, Duquesne].
By Chuck Sharrett
In Duquesne, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit addressed whether a taxpayer could take a double deduction for a
transaction that occurred between the holding in Rite Aid v. United States
and subsequent regulations which clearly disallowed the double deduction
taken by the taxpayer. See Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357
(Fed. Cir. 2001). A double deduction occurs when a parent “uses stock
sales to claim a second deduction for a single loss at the subsidiary (such
as a loss on the subsidiary’s sale of an asset).”
During the period between Rite Aid and Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-35,
it was not clearly established whether a double deduction could be taken
on the sale of subsidiary stock followed by a loss on the subsidiary selling
assets. In Duquesne, a taxpayer group made up of several entities including
Duquesne (“Parent”) and AquaSource (“Subsidiary”), which filed as a
consolidated group, took deductions for losses beginning in 2001 on the
sale by Parent of Subsidiary stock. In the following years, Subsidiary sold
stock in its own subsidiaries, resulting in even more losses that the taxpayer
group deducted. After initially refusing to challenge the deductions taken,
the IRS determined that $199,000,000 of those losses were prohibited
deductions based on the Ilfeld doctrine. Parent filed first with the Tax
Court and petitioned for relief. The taxpayer group and the IRS decided
to simply move forward to summary judgment motions, foregoing
discovery, to determine whether the Ilfeld doctrine was applicable. The
Tax Court determined that it was applicable and that the taxpayer group
had taken double deductions which were prohibited and assessed a
$36,900,000 refund due to the IRS. The taxpayer group appealed, arguing,
among other things, that Ilfeld should not have been applied to the
transaction.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
(“Court”) began its analysis with the history and current state of the Ilfeld
doctrine. This doctrine essentially holds that a double deduction will not
be allowed to a taxpayer unless a statute or regulation explicitly delineates
that as an option. This doctrine also creates a presumption that double
deductions will not be allowed for a single economic loss. Duquesne, 861
F.3d at 409 (citing United Telecomm. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 589 F.2d
1383, 1387–88 (10th Cir. 1978)). There had been some question as to
whether the doctrine was still good law based on several cases not
explicitly overturning it; however, the Court decided to treat it as good
law.
The Court took this doctrine to mean that the taxpayer group,
when filing as a consolidated group, is treated “as a single taxpayer and
‘reduce[s] the significance of each member’s separate existence.’” Id. at
413 (quoting Don Leatherman, Why Rite-Aid is Wrong, 52 Am. L. Rev. 811,
815–16 (2003)). The group is then prevented from taking a double
deduction that might be allowed if the entities were considered separate
for tax purposes.
The taxpayer group attempted to argue that I.R.C. § 165 explicitly
allowed the double deduction. The Court disagreed with them,
determining that § 165 was a “general allowance” for general deductions,
with no definite allowance for double deductions. In addition, the Ilfeld
court, while not explicit, signaled that § 165 was not a double deduction
provision.
The taxpayer group next attempted to argue that, because it
followed the regulations for each separate loss it deducted, the deductions
should be permitted. The Court rejected this argument as well,
determining that at no time did any of the regulations explicitly say that a
double deduction was allowable.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Tax Court’s findings and
upheld application of the Infeld doctrine. The Court established that
“implied authorizations” will not work for double deductions.
Tax attorneys handling consolidated returns for complicated
corporate entity structures should use caution when determining whether
a deduction should be taken on transactions that may relate to a single

820

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 19

economic loss. The Court was clear that, unless there is a statute or
regulation which specifically says a double deduction is allowed, the
double deduction is not allowed. Practitioners need to make sure that
deductions taken with respect to several transactions are either explicitly
allowed as double deductions or that the deductions could not be strewn
as reflecting the same economic loss.

